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Brexit has energised discussions upon Irish (re)unification, with even Theresa May 
recognising that the threat of a no-deal Brexit heightens the possibility of the break up 
of the UK. The increasingly prominent discussion of a so-called “border poll”, however, 
risks disguising the difficulties inherent in arranging such a vote. If no effort is made, 
in advance, to explore the processes by which a united Ireland could be brought about, 
then the peoples of Ireland and Northern Ireland risk being bounced into a choice 
without a reasonable opportunity to make an informed decision. The Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement has been said to provide ‘a clear mechanism through which 
a united Ireland may be achieved’. Judges, however, have emphasised its ‘intensely 
political’ nature and the multiple possible readings that its terms support. Deliberations 
upon (re)unifying Ireland raise questions of domestic law under the two jurisdictions 
on the island of Ireland, European Union law, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and aspects of general international law. These legal considerations are but 
one element of planning for an exercise of consent, taking their place alongside 
political, social and economic considerations. This paper reflects upon the extent to 
which the incorporation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in the law of Ireland and 
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The 29 March 2019 was supposed to be “Brexit day”, but then so, in their turn, were 
11 April and 31 October. The difficulties of successive UK Prime Ministers, Theresa 
May and Boris Johnson, in securing parliamentary support for their versions of a 
Withdrawal Agreement with the European Union (EU), have in large part related to 
how those deals impact upon Northern Ireland. Anxieties over the impact of these 
proposals, and of the possibility that the UK might leave the EU without a deal, have 
in their turn reshaped and reenergised debate over Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
status under the terms of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA).1  
Taking the opportunity provided by the first of these anti-climactic “Brexit days”, 
the former President of Ireland Mary McAleese ruminated upon the steps which might 
need to be taken ahead of a referendum on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future: 
 
Long before any future referendum goes live, we need to do what Brexit has 
abjectly failed to do – that is to delve deeply and objectively and in a considered 
way into all the many issues raised by a possible ending of partition, from fears 
over identity, to governance and representation from flags, emblems to the 
islands’ relationship with the United Kingdom, from economics to esoterics.2 
 
Such suggestions have prompted ire amongst some Unionists. One commentator 
describes the debate as a form of ‘political harassment’,3 and the Democratic Unionist 
Party’s (DUP’s) leader in Westminster, Nigel Dodds, has fulminated, without providing 
any specific basis, that ‘people who call for a border poll are clearly in breach of the 
Belfast Agreement’.4 For all of these complaints, even Theresa May voiced her 
concerns that a no-deal Brexit would herald ‘changes to everyday life in Northern 
Ireland that would put the future of our Union at risk’.5 After her proposed Agreement 
                                                          
1 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Ireland (with annexes) (1998) 2114 UNTS 473. 
2 M. McAleese, Dublin City University Brexit Institute Speech (29 March 2019) p.5 available at 
https://www.dcu.ie/news/news/2019/Mar/Mary-McAleese-addresses-DCU-Brexit-Institute.shtml (last 
accessed 25 October 2019). 
3 G. Gudgin, ‘Stop harassing unionists about a united Ireland’ Irish Times (25 August 2017). 
4 A. Madden, ‘Calls for border poll “breach” Good Friday Agreement and we’re not “molly coddled,” says DUP 
after Johnson meeting’ Belfast Telegraph (31 July 2019). 
5 T. May, HC Deb., vol.652, col.827 (14 January 2019). See also In re McCord [2019] NICA 49, [96] (Morgan LCJ). 
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with the EU faltered, and particularly following Boris Johnson’s thwarted ‘do or die’6 
pledges to leave the EU with or without a deal on 31 October 2019, discussion over 
reunification became increasingly urgent.7  
The choreography of a vote on reunification is, however, a more complex 
proposition than is generally recognised.8 Although the GFA has been said to provide 
‘a clear mechanism through which a united Ireland may be achieved’,9 its provisions 
on changing Northern Ireland’s constitutional status are, in important respects, 
ambiguous. In 1998 this issue was effectively set to one side in favour of the immediate 
task of establishing functioning power-sharing arrangements.10 As a result, the GFA 
provides ‘an incomplete (and misunderstood) framework’,11 without any travaux 
préparatoires to aid its interpretation.12 When required to interpret the GFA, judges 
have frequently blanched at its ‘intensely political’ nature and the multiple readings 
that its terms support.13 It might therefore provide an unstable basis for a reunification 
                                                          
6 R. Mason and P. Walker, ‘Brexit: Johnson says Britain will leave EU on 31 October “do or die”’ The Guardian (25 
June 2019). 
7 The details of May and Johnson’s respective draft Withdrawal Agreements are beyond the scope of this article, 
beyond some analysis of how they have been justified in light of the principle of consent; Agreement on the 
Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (25 November 2018) and Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (19 October 2019). 
8 These challenges received academic attention at the time of the 1998 settlement; see, in particular, C. Bell and 
K. Cavanaugh, ‘“Constructive Ambiguity” or Internal Self-Determination? Self-Determination, Group 
Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement’ (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 1345, 1356. For more 
recent analyses focused on the process of a vote on (re)unification, see C. Harvey and M. Bassett, The future of 
our shared island: a paper on the logistical and legal questions surrounding referendums on Irish unity 
(Constitutional Conversations Group, 2019) available at https://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/Our-Shared-Island-A-Paper-on-Unity.pdf (last accessed 25 October 2019) and A. 
Whysall, A Northern Ireland Border Poll (UCL Constitution Unit, 2019) available at 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/elections-and-referendums/working-group-unification-
referendums-island-ireland (last accessed 25 October 2019). 
9 D. Byrne SC, ‘An Irish View of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement: The Interaction of Law and Politics’ (1998) 
22 Fordham ILJ 1206, 1218. See also C. Campbell, F. Ní Aoláin and C. Harvey, ‘The frontiers of legal analysis: 
Reframing the transition in Northern Ireland’ (2003) 66 MLR 317, 320. 
10 As Colin Harvey argued at the time, ‘[w]hether it all works will depend … to a significant extent on how the 
Assembly operates’; C. Harvey, ‘Legality and Legitimacy: The New Assembly in Context’ (1999) 22 Fordham ILJ 
1389, 1414. See also R. Bourke, Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas (Pimlico, 2003) p.3 and J. Todd, ‘Nationalism, 
Republicanism and the Good Friday Agreement’, in J. Ruane and J. Todd (eds), After the Good Friday Agreement: 
Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland (UCD Press, 1999) pp.49-70. 
11 Whysall, n.8, p.5. 
12 See A. Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis (The Belfast Press, 2000) para.1.27. 
13 See Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission [2002] NI 236 (UKHL), [66] (Lord Hobhouse) and Doherty 
v Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2002] 2 IR 252 (IESC), 254 (Keane CJ). In other cases, judges have actively avoided 




process when the legitimacy of any referendum’s outcome is likely to be challenged, 
and especially in light of the possibility of unrest if such complaints gain traction.14 
This article assesses how the GFA’s principle of consent can be 
operationalised. In the first substantive section we consider the exercise of direct 
democracy required by the GFA’s terms against the backdrop of the conduct of the 
Brexit referendum and the process of extricating the UK from the EU. The second 
section proceeds to unpack the underlying rules and principles of international law, 
and constitutional law, which are engaged by (re)unification; self-determination, 
constituent power, democracy, human rights and state succession. We assess how 
these principles could be used to flesh out opaque aspects of the GFA’s provisions on 
changing Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Building on these foundations, the 
third section offers three distinct models for changing Northern Ireland’s status which 
can be accommodated within Ireland and Northern Ireland’s existing legal frameworks. 
We evaluate the extent to which each of these models allow for civic engagement 
within the process of constitutional change. For the Social Democratic and Labour 
Party’s (SDLP’s) leader, Colum Eastwood, there is a ‘special place in hell’ for those 
who push for a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional status without a plan.15 
Forward planning, however, will count for little unless a process is constructed which 
gives these peoples genuine opportunities to debate the constitution of a unified polity, 
without the assumptions of policy makers closing down the choices at issue. The 
peoples of Ireland and Northern Ireland must not find themselves bounced into making 
such a decision by the vicissitudes of Brexit. 
 
The Brexit Backdrop 
 
The Great Disruption 
 
Prior to the Brexit debate the inter-relationships between Ireland, Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain appeared more settled than at any point since partition. The lattice work 
of cross-border institutions established under the GFA ensured that Northern Ireland’s 
relationship with Ireland was deeper than might ordinarily be expected, even for two 
                                                          
14 See Whysall, n.8, p.14. 
15 J. Bell, ‘Special place in hell for those calling for border poll with no united Ireland plan, says SDLP's Eastwood’ 
Belfast Telegraph (23 February 2019). 
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neighbouring EU members.16 Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as part of the UK 
was generally accepted, with the first provision of GFA’s British-Irish Agreement 
outlining that this status could be only be changed in the future with the consent of a 
majority of Northern Ireland’s people.17 These terms were developed from a formula 
established in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973.18 At the time of the 
Agreement there seemed to be no pressing need to probe the meaning of these terms, 
because there was no evidence of majority support for a united Ireland.19 The principle 
of consent has, however, since become a staple feature of debates over Northern 
Ireland’s governance, even being invoked to justify the convoluted arrangements by 
which the Northern Ireland Assembly would agree to the application of EU Single 
Market rules in Northern Ireland after Brexit under Boris Johnson’s draft Withdrawal 
Agreement.20 Despite such claims, the UK Supreme Court maintains that the principle 
applies only to the question of Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK.21  
Debates surrounding potential reform of the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998, 
however, first demonstrated that pressure for UK-wide constitutional change might 
have little-understood consequences for Northern Ireland’s governance 
arrangements.22 The outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum dwarfed and sidelined 
the “British Bill of Rights” debate, re-animating debates about Northern Ireland’s 
governance arrangements, and the degree to which its rules covering customs, 
product regulations, rights and beyond, should align with Ireland or Great Britain. The 
Brexit referendum also raised questions about how a vote on such a complex issue 
should be conducted so as to enable voters to make an informed decision. 
Referendums which contemplate fundamental and far-reaching governance impose 
                                                          
16 See E. Tannam, ‘Intergovernmental and cross-border civil service cooperation: The Good Friday Agreement 
and Brexit’ (2018) 17 Ethnopolitics 243. 
17 GFA, n.1, Constitutional Issues, para.1. The implications of these provisions will be discussed below, but for an 
overview which contextualises these provisions, see R. Mac Ginty, R. Wilford, L. Dowds and G. Robinson, 
Consenting Adults: The principle of consent and Northern Ireland's constitutional future’ (2001) 36 Government 
and Opposition 472. 
18 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, s.1 (UK). A ‘constitutional guarantee’ based upon the will of the 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland was a departure from a previous formulation under the Ireland Act 
1949, s.1(2) (UK), which required the Northern Ireland Parliament to assent to changes in Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status.  
19 See Whysall, n.8, p.1. 
20 ‘The principle of consent is … at the heart of the arrangements’; B. Johnson, HC Deb., vol.666, col.826 (22 
October 2019). 
21 See R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2018] 
AC 61, [135]. 
22 A. O’Donoghue and B. Warwick, ‘Constitutionally Questioned: UK Debates, International Law, and Northern 
Ireland’ (2015) 66 NILQ 93, 98-101. 
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an awesome burden upon the people; to co-opt Edmund Burke, ‘the whole constitution 
must be viewed together; and it must be compared with the actual state of the people, 
and the circumstances of the time’.23 
That the uncertainty surrounding Brexit’s impact upon day-to-day lives and 
livelihoods in Northern Ireland has reopened Northern Ireland’s “constitutional 
question” should come as little surprise; economics has long influenced the lego-
political framework applicable to the Atlantic Isles. The 1800 Acts of Union not only 
fused the islands’ governance arrangements, they explicitly created a customs 
union.24 Decades later, the repeal of the Corn Laws had a disproportionate impact on 
Ireland during the 1845-49 Famine.25 Substantial changes to land tenancy and 
ownership provided the prelude to efforts by Irish Nationalists to achieve Home Rule 
in the 1880s.26 In 1914, the worst slums in Europe were in Dublin, with 36 percent of 
accommodation being one-room tenements.27 In contrast, Belfast had become 
Ireland’s largest city and the hub of its shipbuilding and linen industries (alongside its 
own extensive slums).28 On partition, two thirds of the island’s manufacturing 
production were located in the six counties of Northern Ireland.29 The economy of the 
twenty-six counties of the Saorstát Éireann/Irish Free State, by contrast, amounted to 
a classic post-colonial hybrid, organised around the export of raw materials and 
agricultural produce, with little capacity to produce high-value products.30  
A 1956 Northern Ireland Government pamphlet emphasised the economic case 
for partition, stressing that any effort towards unification would be ‘industrial suicide’ 
                                                          
23 E. Burke, ‘To the Chairman of the Buckinghamshire Meeting – 12 April 1780’, in H.C. Mansfield (ed), Selected 
Letters of Edmund Burke (University of Chicago Press, 1984) p.243. 
24 An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland 1800 40 Geo. 3 c.38, Union with Ireland Act 1800 39 & 40 
Geo. 3 c. 67, Article VI. 
25 See K. O’Rourke, ‘The repeal of the Corn Laws and Irish emigration’ (1994) 31 Explorations in Economic History 
120. 
26 Assignment and Sub-Letting of Land Act 1826, Landlord and Tenant Law Amendment Act, Ireland 1860, 
Landlord and Tenant (Ireland) Act, 1870, Land Law (Ireland) Act 1881 44 & 45 Vict. c. 49, Purchase of Land 
(Ireland) Act 1885 48 & 49 Vict. c.7, Irish Land Act 1887 50 & 51 Vict. c. 33, Land (Purchase) Act 1903 3 Edw. 7 c. 
37 and the Labourers (Ireland) Act 1906 6 Edw. 7 c.37. See also C. O’Grady and G. Owens, Ireland Before and 
After the Famine: Explorations in Economic History, 1800-1925 (Routledge, 1992). 
27 J. Prunty, Dublin Slums, 1800-1925: A Study in Urban Geography (Irish Academic Press, 1998). 
28 See A. Bielenberg, Ireland and the Industrial Revolution; The Impact of the Industrial Revolution on Irish 
Industry, 1801-1922 (Routledge, 2009), A. Bielenberg and P. Solar, ‘The Irish Cotton Industry between the 
Industrial Revolution and Partition' (2007) 34 Irish Economic and Social History 1, and E. O’Malley, ‘The Decline 
of Irish industry in the Nineteenth Century’ (1981) 13 The Economic and Social Review 21. 
29 A. Bielenberg, Industrial Growth in Ireland; c. 1790-1910 (PhD Thesis, LSE) p.89. 
30 See J. Bradley, ‘The History of Economic Development in Ireland, North and South’ in A. Heath, R. Breen and 
C.T. Whelan (eds), Ireland North and South: Perspectives from Social Science (OUP, 1999) 35, p.39. 
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for Northern Ireland.31 The following year, future Irish Supreme Court Judge Donal 
Barrington emphasised the need to tackle economic divergences on the island as part 
of efforts towards (re)unification, lamenting that Ireland’s policy makers ‘never fully 
faced the danger that Partition might be permanent’.32 In the decades after the end of 
the Second World War, however, Northern Ireland’s traditional industries began to 
falter.33 By the late 1960s, Thomas Whitaker, the influential Secretary of the Ireland’s 
Department of Finance, recognised that ending partition would require Ireland to 
replace the £90 million subsidy which London then provided to Northern Ireland, and 
that Ireland must therefore ‘achieve a good “marriage settlement”, in the form of a 
tapering off over a long period of present British subsidisation’.34 The economic 
realities of partition remain pressing. London’s subvention to Northern Ireland is now 
some £9 billion a year, and the gap in GDP between Ireland and Northern Ireland is 
wider than between the two Germanys on reunification in 1989.35 It would, however, 
be simplistic to present the subvention as shifting immediately onto Ireland with the 
end of partition. Transition arrangements would inevitably be part of any “marriage 
settlement”, providing a window for economic integration which would potentially 
remedy some of the dislocations which necessitate the current level of subsidisation.36  
Discussion of the subvention must also be set against the increasing economic 
integration brought about by the GFA settlement and EU membership, which have 
combined to diminish the significance of the border for business and have contributed 
to generating an ‘all-island economy’.37 Nor has this integration been purely economic. 
                                                          
31 W.B. Maginess, ‘The Right to Dissent – Making Democracy Work’, in Northern Ireland Government, Why the 
Border Must Be: The Northern Ireland Case in Brief (HMSO, 1956) p.5. 
32 D. Barrington, ‘United Ireland’ (1957) 46 Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 379, 379. 
33 See R. Rowthorn, ‘Northern Ireland: An Economy in Crisis’ (1981) 5 Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, 3-8. 
Northern Ireland’s Finance Minister acknowledged the weaknesses in the economy in official dealings with the 
UK Treasury, only for officials to make scornful comments on the need for Northern Ireland to walk ‘the path of 
financial rectitude’; UK National Archives (UKNA) Handwritten note by Sir Edward Compton (Third Secretary to 
the Treasury) (6 November 1956).  
34 Irish National Archives File 2001/8/1, T.K. Whitaker ‘A Note on North-South Border Policy’ (11 November 1968) 
p.2. 
35 See J. FitzGerald and E. Morgenroth, The Northern Ireland Economy: Problems and Prospects (TCD, 2019) 
pp.33-37 available at https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2019/tep0619.pdf (last accessed 25 October 2019) 
and the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and the Future 
of Ireland Uniting Ireland and Its People in Peace and Prosperity (August 2017) p.309. 
36 See S. McGuinness and A. Bergin, The Political Economy of a Northern Ireland Border Poll (IZA Institute, 2019) 
pp.22-23 available at https://www.esri.ie/system/files/publications/OPEA173.pdf (last accessed 25 October 
2019). 
37 Joint Report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress 
during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
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For nearly a century, the distinct ethos of Ireland’s two polities reflected the clash of 
nationalisms at work on the island. At the height of the Northern Ireland conflict, 
episodes like the rejection of the introduction of divorce in Ireland in 1986 were treated 
by some commentators as evidencing the fundamental incompatibility of the two 
polities.38 Since then, however, three decades of far-ranging constitutional change 
have gripped Ireland and Northern Ireland. The GFA, in particular, connected rights 
protections across the Irish border.39 Most recently, the amendments to the Northern 
Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019 regarding marriage equality and reproductive 
rights have contributed to the increasing alignment of the protections of fundamental 
rights on either side of the border.40 It can therefore come as little surprise that the 
border’s current “invisibility” for most private day-to-day purposes has become such a 
significant feature of the Brexit debate.41 
 
Contrasting Constitutional Cultures 
 
Referendums have long been treated differently in Ireland and the UK. Their use in 
the UK has been sporadic and formally subordinate to the operation of parliamentary 
sovereignty.42 By contrast, referendums are the only method by which to effect 
constitutional change in Ireland. Ireland has therefore held repeated referendums on 
the same or similar topics, voting on different aspects of the law of abortion, for 
example, six times since the early 1980s.43 The contrast in these systemic approaches 
to referendums is reflected in how they are organised. Before the referendum on the 
Thirty-sixth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, for example, a Citizens’ Assembly44 
                                                          
European Union, TF50 (2017) 19, para.47-48. See also T. Connelly, Brexit and Ireland: The Dangers, the 
Opportunities, and the Inside Story of the Irish Response (2nd ed, Penguin, 2018) p.101. 
38 See T. Hadden and K. Boyle, ‘Hopes and Fears for Hillsborough’ (1986) 75 Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 
384, 386-387. 
39 GFA, n.1, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, para.9. See C. Harvey, ‘Building Bridges – Protecting 
Human Rights in Northern Ireland’ (2001) 1 HRLRev 243, 252.  
40 Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act 2019, ss.8-9 (UK). See P. Walker and R. Carroll, ‘MPs vote to extend 
abortion and same-sex marriage rights to Northern Ireland’ The Guardian (9 July 2019). 
41 S. de Mars, C. Murray, A. O’Donoghue and B. Warwick, Bordering Two Unions: Northern Ireland and Brexit 
(Policy Press, 2018) pp.90-91. 
42 Unless the UK Parliament has specified the steps which will follow a referendum outcome in law, it is advisory 
in nature; see Miller, n.21, [121]. See also S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of 
Republican Deliberation (OUP, 2012) pp.25-26. 
43 F. de Londras and M. Enright, Repealing the 8th (Policy Press, 2018) pp.3-5. 
44 Final Report on the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the Citizens’ Assembly, available at 
https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-on-the-Eighth-
Amendment-of-the-Constitution/ (last accessed 25 October 2019). 
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and an Oireachtas Committee45 both undertook extensive discussions and 
deliberations on abortion and the Irish Government produced draft Heads of Bill.46 
Other significant referendums in Ireland have been preceded by Constitutional 
Conventions. In the UK, by contrast, the consultative nature of most referendums is 
reflected in a more laissez-faire approach to referendum preparation, as exemplified 
by the Brexit referendum.47 The debates which preceded the 2016 referendum, for 
example, barely touched upon the potential implications for Northern Ireland which 
would come to dominate the Brexit process.48 Prime Minister David Cameron’s 
decision to prevent civil servants planning for a pro-Brexit outcome contributed to 
general uncertainty both before and after the vote.49 This divergent practice 
complicates the planning of concurrent votes which propose uniting Ireland, before we 
even start to unpack the principles at issue in such referendums.  
 
The principles applicable to changes in statehood  
 
The process of exchanging one governance order for another engages both 
international law and the relevant domestic constitutional contexts. Concepts such as 
constituent power, the right to self-determination and democracy will underpin any 
decision-making processes regarding (re)unification. These principles are not 
synonymous; while they may work together, they are not substitutes for each other.50 
Constituent power operates during the determination of the form and content of a 
governance order, the right to self-determination is recognised in international law as 
the right of a people to choose statehood and government, and democracy requires 
the operation of universal suffrage in the making of governance decisions and/or in 
                                                          
45 Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution available at 
https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Joint-Oireachtas-
Committee-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution-/ (last accessed 25 October 2019). 
46 General Scheme of A Bill to Regulate Termination of Pregnancy, 27 March 2018, Department of Health 
(Ireland), available at https://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/General-Scheme-for-Publication.pdf 
(last accessed 25 October 2019). 
47 See A. Weale, The Will of the People: A Modern Myth (Polity 2018) pp.115-116. The 1998 referendums relating 
to the GFA do, however, illustrate how quickly both polities can organise referendums where circumstances 
demand.  
48 There was no attempt, for example, to reach an agreement with Ireland as to the implications of Brexit for the 
GFA ahead of the referendum, comparable to the declaration which preceded Ireland’s 2004 referendum on the 
twenty-seventh amendment of the Constitution of Ireland; see de Mars, et al., n.41, p.147. 
49 Foreign Affairs Committee (UK House of Commons), Implications of Leaving the EU for the UK's Role in the 
World (19 July 2016) HC 431, pp.9-11. 
50 See G. Duke, ‘European Constitutionalism and Constituent Power’ (2019) 44 ELRev 50, 66. 
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the periodic choice of the representatives who will do so. The emphasis that these 
principles place upon the voice of the peoples within Ireland and Northern Ireland 
potentially challenge political actors’ and commentators’ assumptions about how 




Constituent power holders choose the form and substantive character of the system 
by which they are governed. Constituent power provides the legitimating basis for 
constitutional governance orders, and is closely aligned with popular sovereignty. The 
contrast between parliamentary and popular sovereignty and the impact on 
governance cultures in the two polities thus requires consideration.51 Constituent 
power is tied to the grant of constituted power, providing the essential source of 
governmental authority.52 Stephen Tierney argues that constituent power is ‘the 
unbridled, democratic power of the sovereign people, every moment reinvented anew 
… wherein fundamental constitutional norms … are elevated beyond the reach of the 
temporal majorities’.53 Constituent power is thus essential to the creation of 
constitutions. Although constituent power holders will not all agree upon where 
constituted power should rest or how constitutionalism operates, the constitutional 
order will determine how such competing political interests are managed.  
Although the identity of constituent power holders is often taken for granted, 
radical changes such as the merger of two polities necessarily redefine constituent 
actors. In a process to decide whether there should be a united Ireland, there are two 
existing groups of constituent power holders.54 The people of Ireland, who have 
adopted the Irish Constitution, hold popular sovereignty and exercise their constituent 
power by choosing the holders of constituted power and through making alterations to 
that Constitution. In Ireland, a referendum on (re)unification therefore involves these 
existing constituent power holders agreeing to the creation of a new group based upon 
the territory of the whole island of Ireland. The concurrent referendum in Northern 
Ireland instead concerns the people of Northern Ireland extinguishing their constituent 
                                                          
51 See M. Loughlin, Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003) p.99. 
52 See, on affected interest, R.A. Dahl, After the Revolution? (Yale University Press, 1970) pp.64-67.  
53 S. Tierney, ‘Sovereignty’, in E.A. Christodoulidis and S. Tierney, Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits 
of Constitutionalism (Ashgate, 2008) p.15. 
54 See Tierney, n.42, pp.241-259. 
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power within the UK and choosing to join with the people of Ireland. A favourable 
outcome would also alter the operation of constituent power within the UK (shrinking 
that country’s pool of constituent power holders).  
Assuming that the referendums favour (re)unification, further questions will 
arise as to the relationship between the new group of constituent power holders on the 
island of Ireland and the Irish Constitution, and the relationship which some of this 
group will maintain with the UK (for example, through retained UK citizenship). If it is 
‘inherent in a constitution in the full sense of the term that it goes back to an act taken 
by or at least attributed to the people’,55 such a radical redefinition of the demos must 
bring with it a reconsideration of Ireland’s constitutional order. At what point would it 
be necessary for this new group of constituent power holders to exercise their popular 
sovereignty in confirming the existing Irish Constitution, or adopting a new or an 
adapted Constitution? Very different questions arise, however, if the outcomes of the 
two referendums do not align; for example, if Ireland votes against reunification and 




Whereas Ireland, alongside much of the world, was excluded from self-determination’s 
first international legal iteration, through the implementation of US President Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Point Plan at the Versailles Peace Conference, this principle now 
forms part of customary international law.56 The right to self-determination is also a 
core feature of the UN Charter.57 The content, extent and current status of the right, 
however, remain deeply contested.58 Generally, there is agreement as to the 
                                                          
55 D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’ (1995) 1 ELJ 282, 289. 
56 F.M. Carroll, ‘The American Commission on Irish Independence and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919’ (1985) 
2 Irish Studies in International Affairs 103 and J.B. Duff, ‘The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans’ (1968) 55 
The Journal of American History 582. Colonies of other Allied powers, such as Vietnam, were also excluded from 
the Conference in the same manner as the Irish delegation and made similar efforts to petition it. 
57 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories 
and Peoples’, 14 December 1960, A/RES/1514(XV). See also UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, Declaration 
on Friendly Relations’, 24 October 1970, A/RES/25/2625, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia) (Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, Accordance with international law of the 
unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403. For 
commentary, see S. Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law 
and Practice (OUP, 1996) p.41.  
58 For an overview of the academic debate, see the contributions within D. French (ed), Statehood and Self-
Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (CUP, 2013). 
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application of self-determination in the decolonisation process, but whether it extends 
to the formation of new states for minority, ethnic, national or regional groups remains 
contested.59 Self-determination can be divided into several categories; internal self-
determination, which could cover the current devolved settlement in Northern Ireland, 
and external self-determination, the most recent example of which is the creation of 
South Sudan.60 It can further be divided into remedial, colonial and secessionary 
forms, although even these categories are disputed.61  
When Austen Morgan asserts that the GFA’s treatment of self-determination is 
‘legally incoherent’, he assumes that international law requires it to be manifested in a 
specific form.62 The central issue for him is whether the people of the island of Ireland 
constitutes a group under the requirements of international law; ‘If they do, they have 
fulfilled one condition for an unqualified right; if they do not, they have no right’.63 
International law, however, primarily addresses the existence of the right to self-
determination, and accepts that this right may be operationalised in specific instances 
by agreement amongst the relevant parties.64 Writing even  before the GFA was 
concluded, Gerry Simpson recognised that in instances like this ‘international law has 
abdicated the field, accepting the series of experimental, ad hoc domestic 
arrangements with little international oversight’.65 Despite Morgan’s complaints, 
international law thus accommodates the GFA’s iteration of self-determination, 
forestalling any debate as to whether its operation in the Northern Ireland context 
would be secessionary, colonial or remedial.66 The GFA, moreover, recognises the 
                                                          
59 As to whether Northern Ireland comes under the categorisation of colony in international law, see A. Carty, 
Was Ireland Conquered: International Law and the Irish Question (Pluto Press, 1996) pp.155-159. 
60 See J. Summers, ‘The Internal and External Aspects of Self-Determination Reconsidered’ in D. French (ed), 
Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (CUP, 2013) 229 
and J. Waldron, ‘Two Conceptions of Self-Determination’ in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (OUP, 2010) 397, pp.397-398. 
61 A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (OUP, 
2003) 206 and G. Binder, ‘The Case for Self-Determination’ in R. McCorquodale (ed), Self-Determination in 
International Law (Ashgate, 2000) 141. 
62 Morgan, n.12, para.9.31.  
63 ibid., para.9.32. 
64 International law imposes stricter obligations where independence from situations of colonialism are at issue; 
See Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory Opinion), 
(25 February 2019) ICJ, para.157-158.  
65 G. Simpson, ‘The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age’ (1996) 32 Stanford JIL 
255, 258. 
66 Likewise, the doctrine of uti possidetis juris – which forestalls changes to existing borders – does not apply as 
both the UK and Ireland have agreed to potential boundary changes. Further, there would not be a question as 
to whether the exercise of self-determination was by lawful means; see UN Security Council Resolution 541, 
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self-determination claims of ‘the people of the island of Ireland alone’.67 Although its 
subsequent terms reveal that this group includes distinct peoples of Northern Ireland 
and Ireland, the implication is that any interference with these processes, or actions 
not taken in good faith, by the UK government, would be in breach of international law. 
This good-faith obligation was foreshadowed during the unification of the Germanies.68 
Under the 1945 Berlin Declaration the Allied Powers had ‘supreme authority with 
respect to German’,69 seemingly permitting outside interference in the settlement of 
self-determination. And yet, under the 1990 Treaty on Final Settlement, these 
countries terminated their rights and responsibilities, recognising that they were bound 
to accept Germany’s exercise of self-determination.70  
The GFA recognises Northern Ireland’s right to self-determination, establishes 
that this right is manifested in power-sharing institutions which possess (when 
operating) a level of autonomy within the UK, and sets the terms for potential change. 
It therefore ‘addresses one of the very problems created by the international law of 
self-determination – the perpetuation of two irreconcilable self-determination claims 
that both have validity’.71 Under international law, even when a referendum favours 
secession, this does not necessarily give rise to independence as of right,72 but rather 
opens up discussions on a range of settlement options, including enhanced 
autonomy.73 However, under the GFA, the UK made a binding commitment to accept 
secession as the outcome of a referendum which supports changing Northern 
Ireland’s constitutional status.74 In another exercise of self-determination, Ireland 
reserves the possible incorporation of Northern Ireland to determination through its 
domestic structures. Byrne argues that in the 1998 referendums the majority in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland accepted that, in terms of politics, of morality, and of international 
                                                          
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 18 November 1983 and UN Security Council Resolution 216, Southern 
Rhodesia, 12 November 1965. 
67 GFA, n.1, Constitutional Issues, para.1(ii). 
68 J.A. Frowein, ‘The Reunification of Germany’ (1992) 86 AJIL 151, 152. 
69 Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with Respect to 
Germany by the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, 
5 June 1945, 68 UNTS 189. This treaty also detailed the relevant international boundaries.  
70 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany 1990 (1990) 29 ILM 1187.  
71 Bell and Cavanaugh, n.8, 1361. 
72 J. Vidmar, ‘The Scottish Independence Referendum in an International Context’ (2013) 51 Can YBIL 259, 259. 
73 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217, [91] (Can). 
74 Vidmar, n.72, 263. 
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law, unity could only occur through concurrent consent.75 Such claims can be read 
alongside the Irish Supreme Court’s assertion that the people’s will expressed in a 
referendum outcome ‘is sacrosanct and if freely given, cannot be interfered with. The 
decision is theirs and theirs alone’.76 The ‘people of Northern Ireland’ and ‘people of 
Ireland’ were accepted as peoples by both the UK and Irish Governments even before 
GFA,77 and the 1998 referendums legitimate that approach. Even if these 
arrangements are far from a perfect fit within international law, the GFA provides the 




Democracy is a notoriously difficult concept to define,79 but is nonetheless prominent 
in the 1998 settlement. Much as the Brexit referendum outcome is significant in being 
an exercise of democracy, the GFA’s legitimacy rests upon exercises of democracy. 
Voters in Northern Ireland affirmed the GFA, the electorate in Ireland voted on its 
implications and democracy provides the basis on which its self-determination 
provisions can be exercised. Democracy is also at the core of how Ireland describes 
itself in its Constitution,80 and the Representation of the People Act 1983 affirms the 
importance of democratic elections within the UK’s constitutional order.  
Thin accounts of democracy locate the concept in the expression of majority 
will through referendums and elections, but thicker accounts encompass freedom of 
expression, association and press, access to education and information, universal 
suffrage and a lack of undue influence from economic, religious or other 
unaccountable groups and freedom from subjugation.81 Thick democracy is less 
concerned with certainty and conformity than with tackling social exclusion within 
democratic the process. As Carole Pateman argues, assumptions that universal 
suffrage leads to the full political emancipation and participation of women – and by 
analogy groups including the Traveller Community, immigrants, the LGBTQ 
                                                          
75 Byrne, n.9, 1220. 
76 Hanafin v Minister for the Environment [1996] 2 IR 321 (IESC), 425 (Hamilton CJ). 
77 R. McCorquodale, ‘Negotiating Sovereignty: The Practice of the United Kingdom in Regard to the Right to Self-
Determination’ (1995) 66 BYIL 283, 296. 
78 ibid., 297-298. 
79 R.A. Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press, 2000) pp.2-5. 
80 Constitution of Ireland, Article 5. 
81 Dahl, n.79, p.100. 
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community and those with disabilities – have long been proved to be incorrect.82 These 
groups have long been marginalised within political debate in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland.83 In Northern Ireland in particular, consociationalism arguably continues to 
entrench one set of identities over all others within devolved politics.84 A commitment 
to ‘parity of esteem’ across society in Northern Ireland, which runs deeper than that 
provided by a “two communities” approach, requires that the choices opened to voters 
by the reunification process not be dominated by the demands of extreme voices, to 
the exclusion of already marginalised groups.85  
 




Changing circumstances including decolonisation, merger, secession, the creation or 
dissolution of a federation, or, potentially, climate change, can contribute to the 
creation of a new state or states and the invocation of the law of state succession. 
These rules settle questions of continuing membership of international organisations, 
responsibility for sovereign debt and other broader responsibilities.86 Ireland’s historic 
relationship with the UK has long been a trap for the unwary, as illustrated by one of 
the UK Government’s official documents on the consequences of Scottish 
independence ahead of the 2014 referendum. Having described Ireland as a ‘colony’ 
prior to the Act of Union, the authors declared that ‘Scottish and English writers unite 
in seeing the incorporation of Ireland not as the creation of a new state but as an 
accretion without any consequences in international law’.87 Setting aside the offhand 
                                                          
82 C. Pateman, The Disorder of Women Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford University Press, 
1990) p.17. 
83 See L. Connolly, The Irish Women's Movement: From Revolution to Devolution (Macmillan/Palgrave, 2003); M. 
Gilmartin, C. McGing and K. Browne, ‘Feminist and Gender Geographies in Ireland’ (2019) 25 Gender, Place & 
Culture (forthcoming) and Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind”: Travellers’ 
Accommodation in NI (March 2018) available at http://www.nihrc.org/publication/detail/out-of-sight-out-of-
mind-travellers-accommodation-in-ni-executive-summary (last accessed 25 October 2019). 
84 See A. Little, Democracy and Northern Ireland: Beyond the Liberal Paradigm? (Springer, 2004) pp.152-163. 
85 GFA, n.1, Constitutional Issues, para.1(v). See R. Houghton, ‘Commentary on McGimpsey v Ireland’ in A. 
O’Donoghue, M. Enright and J. McCandless, Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges' Troubles and the 
Gendered Politics of Identity (Hart, 2017) 221, p.228. 
86 For an overview, see J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed, OUP, 2006) pp.667-672. 
87 See A. Boyle and J. Crawford, ‘Opinion: Referendum on the Independence of Scotland – International Law 
Aspects’ in Annex 2 Scotland Analysis: Devolution and the Implications of Scottish Independence (12 Feb 2013) 
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recognition of Ireland’s colonisation in an opinion issued by the UK Government (and 
the consequences for Northern Ireland in international law which would potentially 
persist if this account is accurate88), if Northern Ireland and Ireland were to become 
one state, two reconstituted states would result, which we can for the purposes of this 
article call Éire/Ireland and Great Britain (the name applied to the polity created 
following the enactment of the 1706 and 1707 Acts of Union).89 The UK has, of course, 
been reconstituted on multiple occasions, most recently when the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland fractured, resulting in the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the creation of the Saorstát Éireann/Irish Free State.90 Both 
states, it must be recognised, would be free to adopt new names.91  
Several outcomes are possible in such circumstances. When Czechoslovakia 
split the Czech Republic and Slovakia became “clean slates”. The end of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) led to one continuing state, the Russian Federation, 
alongside several new states.92 The re-emergence of the Baltic States as part of that 
process provides further examples which could be applicable to Irish unification.93 The 
break-up of Yugoslavia, however, demonstrates the complications which result when 
there is no agreement as to whether emergent polities are new or continuing states.94 
The long-running dispute on North Macedonia’s name, and the continued disputed 
status of Kosovo, demonstrate the particularly long tail of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.95 
Unification creates particular complications, as demonstrated in the creation of 
                                                          
para.36, available from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scotland-analysis-devolution-and-the-
implications-of-scottish-independence (last accessed 25 October 2019). See also Carty, n.59, p.75. 
88 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, n.57. See also A. Maguire, ‘Contemporary anti-colonial self-
determination claims and the decolonisation of international law’ (2013) 22 Griffith LR 238. 
89 An Act for a Union of the Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland 1706, c. 11 and the Act Ratifying and 
Approving the Treaty of Union of the Two Kingdoms of Scotland and England 1707, c. 7.  
90 See N. Davies, Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-Forgotten Europe (Penguin, 2011) p.635. Saorstát 
Éireann was a Dominion under UK law, but even prior to the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great 
Britain and Ireland (6 Dec 1921) it had attempted to establish itself as an independent state under international 
law; see A. O’Donoghue, ‘The Inimitable Form of Irish Neutrality: From the Birth of the State to World War II’ 
(2008) 30 Dublin ULJ 259, 268-271.  
91 There is the example of North Macedonia, but it is a sui generis case; F. Messineo, ‘Maps of Ephemeral 
Empires: The ICJ and the Macedonian Name Dispute’ (2012) 1 Cambridge J. Int’l & Comp. L. 169. 
92 See R. Mullerson, ‘The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the Former USSR and Yugoslavia’ 
(1993) 42 ICLQ 473 and M. Craven, ‘The Problem of State Succession and Identity of States under International 
Law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 142. 
93 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The present state of research carried out by the English-speaking section of the Centre for 
Studies and Research of the Hague Academy of International Law’ in M. Koskenniemi (ed), State Succession: 
Codification Tested Against the Facts (Brill, 1996) 89, p.127. 
94 Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v Belgium) (Preliminary Objections) [2004] ICJ Rep 279 
para.25 and 54-91. See also Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7. 
95 See The Prespa Agreement (17 June 2018). 
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Germany and Italy in the Nineteenth Century and the unification of the two Germanies 
and Vietnams in the Twentieth Century.96 States often settle such issues via treaty; for 
instance, the Treaty of St. Germain tackled the creation of new states emerging from 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.97 In reality, each instance is sui generis.  
One ongoing linguistic skirmish concerns whether the unification or 
reunification of Ireland is at issue, a debate which is as old as partition and which the 
GFA’s terms side-step. The Chairman of the Boundary Commission, established after 
partition, exercised his mandate on the basis that Northern Ireland had, prior to 
Ireland’s independence, already been ‘established and defined’ by the Government of 
Ireland Act 1920.98 On this account Ireland, as encompassing the sum of the island, 
has never existed as a state, thereby preventing the use of reunification. By contrast, 
Irish case law suggests that, under Article 11-12 of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, the 
territorial jurisdiction of Saorstát Éireann encompassed the entire island, even if these 
terms only applied in practical effect for a day before Northern Ireland’s then 
Parliament took steps to withdraw from the provisions applicable to Ireland as a 
whole.99 Such an act of withdrawal had to take place to stop the terms of the 1921 
Treaty applying to Northern Ireland; for example, the terms of the Treaty envisaged 
that Belfast Lough would be one of the UK’s Treaty Ports in Ireland if Northern Ireland 
did not withdraw.100 Reunification may therefore be a better term, but because the 
1998 changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution removed the territorial claim 
to the whole island, the distinction between these terms makes little legal difference. 
The Vienna Convention on State Succession 1978 is generally reflective of 
customary international law.101 In broad terms, under Article 34 the original or 
continuing state(s) is presumed to maintain its obligations and rights under 
international law. The position of other parties, in particular countries which have 
                                                          
96 Agreement with Respect to the Unification of Germany (1991) 30 ILM 457. See Frowein, n.68, 157-159.  
97 Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) UKTS 11 (Cmd. 400). 
98 Carty, n.59, p.142. 
99 In re Logue [1933] 67 ILTR 253. See T. Mohr, ‘Law and the Foundation of the Irish State on 6 December 1922’  
(2018) 59 Irish Jurist 31. 
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Irish Trade Agreement 1938 (Irish Treaty Series) which ended the Trade War between the states also repudiated 
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treaties with the state(s) in question, is also relevant. In the event of Irish reunification, 
both Ireland and Great Britain would likely be continuing states, if that is what both 
choose. The definition of statehood under international law sustains this analysis; 
although changes of population and territory are involved, these would not be of such 
significance as to question their status as continuing states.102 As such, they would 
have to come to a bilateral agreement concerning responsibilities for sovereign debt 
and state pensions, amongst other issues. Their new boundaries would also change 
the nature of claims regarding territorial seas and access to natural resources under 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.103 In terms of human rights, regardless of 
whether the emerging polities are new, successor or continuing states, state and 
international organisational practice generate ongoing obligations.104 International law 
requires that the rights, responsibilities and obligations of all states be fulfilled, 
regardless of whether their successor states are new or continuing.105 
The status of continuing state is nonetheless important, in that it resolves 
difficulties which Irish reunification might otherwise create in terms of Ireland and Great 
Britain’s memberships of international and supranational organisations. Ireland, 
indeed, has already indicated that it would want to be considered a continuing state in 
these circumstances. In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, the Irish Government 
negotiated with the EU that the example of German reunification would apply in the 
event of a vote for unification under the terms of the GFA.106 The European Council 
accepted that, ‘in accordance with international law, the entire territory of such a united 
Ireland would thus be part of the European Union’.107 This puts a united Ireland in a 
very different position to Scotland if the latter voted for independence after Brexit. 
Whereas in such circumstances Scotland would have to undertake the EU accession 
                                                          
102 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) 165 LNTS 20, Article 1. For examples of 
state practice, see Boyle and Crawford, n.87, para.53-92. 
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process as a new Member State,108 Ireland can absorb the territory of Northern 
Ireland, even if that territory will become external to the EU after Brexit, without calling 
into question Ireland’s status as a continuing EU Member State. For the EU, 
reunification amounts to a ‘reshaping the borders of the State’.109  
Beyond the EU, reunification could prompt a reconsideration of Ireland’s 
relationship with other international organisations. Ireland would, for example, be able 
to apply to the Commonwealth as part of the reunification process. Indeed, Richard 
Humphreys has promoted this idea as a bridge-building precursor to any reunification 
process.110 For Great Britain, continuing-state status is particularly important in the 
context of the UK’s current permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Given the 
acceptance of the Russian Federation as the continuing state after the break-up of the 
USSR, it is unlikely that the reunification of Ireland would result in a contest of Great 
Britain’s position on the UN Security Council.111 In short, if both new entities seek to 
be treated as continuing states, this intention is unlikely to be contestable. 
 
International Dispute Settlement 
 
Should the UK or Ireland fail to fulfil the GFA’s terms (for instance, by the UK refusing 
to allow the people of Northern Ireland “freely exercise” their choice over its 
constitutional status, or declining to implement the outcome of any such referendum) 
there is limited scope for either state to institute action under international law. 
Although it is an international treaty, and such a breach would amount to an 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, there is no dispute settlement clause in GFA.112  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) would not have jurisdiction over the 
GFA, even though both states have made declarations of compulsory jurisdiction as 
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each also included qualifications to that jurisdiction.113 Ireland’s is the most relevant, 
in that it specifically excludes disputes that arise between it and the UK with regard to 
Northern Ireland. The UK’s declaration, which states that ‘any dispute with the 
government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the 
Commonwealth’, may also exclude jurisdiction. It might be argued that Ireland was 
never a member of the modern Commonwealth, having left just before the 1949 
London Declaration and that this clause does not therefore apply.114 Even so, the Irish 
declaration renders the point moot. Both states could mutually agree to accept ad hoc 
ICJ jurisdiction, or establish a stand-alone dispute panel, but would be under no 
obligation to do so. An alternative approach, following the success of Mauritius’ 
campaign over the Chagos Islands, would be for the aggrieved state to petition the UN 
General Assembly to instruct the ICJ to issue an Advisory Opinion on the GFA’s 
application.115 The context might facilitate such an effort to drum up international 
support, but the UK Government’s vociferous response to the ICJ’s issuing of the 
Chagos Archipelago Opinion (as an intrusion upon a bilateral dispute), and refusal to 
abide by its terms, foreshadow the likely outcomes of any such effort.116 This channels 
challenges into domestic processes of judicial review, which will be discussed below. 
 
Exchanging Governance Orders under Domestic Constitutional Law 
 
The UK  
 
A Border Poll 
The continuing use of “border poll” to describe a referendum on Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status as part of the UK is remarkable, given that the term was conjured 
up by Edward Heath’s administration in 1972 in its unsuccessful attempt to put the 
constitutional question to rest.117 At the time, the Northern Ireland Secretary refused 
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to explain the distinction between a border poll and a referendum or plebiscite (and 
the terms were used interchangeably in internal papers).118 From inception to poll took 
less than six months, with expediency being prioritised over meaningful constitutional 
debate.119 The resultant nationalist boycott of the 1973 vote undermined the credibility 
of an exercise which was intended to provide a platform for the Sunningdale 
negotiations over power sharing.120 And yet, even though constitutional language is 
so often hotly contested in Northern Ireland, the term continues to be widely 
employed.121 
Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which incorporates the GFA’s principle of 
consent into UK domestic law, the Secretary of State is responsible for instituting such 
a vote.122 UK legislation rarely allocates public powers and duties to specific cabinet 
ministers, the concept of the Secretary of State being sufficiently general to allow for 
reorganisations of government departments without necessitating wholesale reform of 
the statute book.123 In this instance, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would 
nonetheless be the directly responsible minister.124 The Secretary of State is given the 
general discretionary power to institute what the Act continues to refer to as ‘a poll’ on 
Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK.125 This power, however, becomes a duty 
(the legislation requires that the minister ‘shall’ do so) in circumstances when it 
appears ‘likely’ to him/her that a majority of Northern Ireland’s electorate would support 
a united Ireland.126 This duty is, however, contingent then upon the minister’s ‘political 
assessment of public opinion’.127 The legislation does not specify how this assessment 
should be conducted, with election results in Northern Ireland or opinion polling 
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providing possible measures of public opinion.128 Questions regarding this ‘political 
assessment’ have become increasingly regular amidst the Brexit saga, receiving a 
near-standardised response; ‘[i]t remains the Northern Ireland Secretary’s view that 
the majority of the people of Northern Ireland continue to support the current political 
settlement and that the circumstances requiring a border poll are not satisfied’.129  
Even though the wording of the Act places considerable weight upon a personal 
appraisal of public opinion, the Northern Ireland Secretary’s judgement over whether 
the conditions for a referendum have been fulfilled could still be subject to judicial 
review. As judges have noted in cases relating to the 1998 settlement, the decision is 
clearly one of high policy, in which the courts would ordinary permit a decision maker 
exercising her ‘political judgment’ considerable leeway.130 Then again, the GFA’s 
requirement that the UK Government display ‘rigorous impartiality’ in decision making 
affecting Northern Ireland’s governance,131 should condition such decisions.132 Some 
clarity was achieved in 2018, when the campaigner Raymond McCord challenged the 
Northern Ireland Secretary’s failure to publish a policy explaining how she would 
exercise her powers. Girvan LJ refused to circumscribe the minister’s approach where 
such a complex decision was at issue.133 He nonetheless provided an extended 
interpretation of schedule 1 of the Northern Ireland Act: 
 
It is necessarily implied in this provision that the Secretary of State must honestly 
reflect on the evidence available to her to see whether it leads her to the 
conclusion that the majority would be likely to vote in favour of a united Ireland. 
Evidence of election results and opinion polls may form part of the evidential 
context in which to exercise the judgment whether it appears to the Secretary of 
State that there is likely to be a majority for a united Ireland. The overall evidential 
                                                          
128 See Harvey and Bassett, n.8, para.53. 
129 J. Campbell, ‘Shadow NI Secretary Sceptical about Irish Unity Vote’ BBC (6 February 2019) available at 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-47143679 (last accessed 25 October 2019). 
130 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32, [12] (Lord Bingham). 
131 GFA, n.1, Constitutional Issues, para.1(v). ibid., [25] (Lord Hoffmann). 
132 The Divisional Court refused permission for judicial review when it was claimed that the DUP’s confidence-
and-supply arrangement with the Conservative Party after the 2017 General Election breached the GFA’s 
rigorous impartiality requirement in McClean v First Secretary of State (CO/3220/2017) (unreported), but this 
was on the basis that a challenge against a parliamentary arrangement, as opposed to public authority decision 
making, was unarguable.  
133 In re McCord [2018] NIQB 106, [21]. 
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context on how it should be analysed and viewed is a matter for the Secretary of 
State.134 
 
Any future judicial review is therefore likely to hinge on this requirement of honest 
reflection on the part of the Northern Ireland Secretary.  
This judgment potentially permits game playing.135 Even if consistent opinion 
polling in Northern Ireland did suggest a majority in favour of a united Ireland, if the 
UK Government wanted to stymie calls for a vote the Northern Ireland Secretary could, 
for example, delay a decision out of a supposed desire for more evidence of popular 
opinion. Given that such a decision goes to the heart of the divide between Unionism 
and Nationalism within Northern Ireland, any such moves would undoubtedly be 
litigated.136 Notwithstanding the substantial level of discretion which Girvan LJ 
identifies, the Northern Ireland Act’s provisions are designed to operationalise the 
GFA’s principle of consent, and courts should therefore treat any overt effort to block 
this process as an illegal effort by the UK Government to thwart the legislation’s 
underlying purpose.137 The Secretary of State should, at the very least, be expected 
to detail the reasons behind the UK Government’s approach to its obligation once 
some evidence suggests majority support for a referendum.138 Following the 
September 2019 Ashcroft poll, which pointed to majority support in Northern Ireland 
for reunification in the event of a no-deal Brexit, this condition could be on the cusp of 
being fulfilled.139 Once such reasons are in the public domain interested parties would 
be better able to examine the factors taken into account by the Secretary of State and 
challenge any perceived inadequacies or appearance of bias in the decision. The 
                                                          
134 ibid., [20]. 
135 Due to a lack of political will at Westminster, coupled with the paralysis within Northern Ireland politics, many 
important provisions of the Northern Ireland Act have not been implemented, notably with regard to the 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights; see C. Harvey, ‘Mutual Respect? Interrogating Human Rights in a Fractured Union’ 
(2018) 29 KLJ 216, 234-237.  
136 An alternative form of game playing might be a “pre-emptive” poll ahead of a perceived period of pressure 
upon the current constitutional settlement, given that Northern Ireland Act imposes a seven-year hiatus of at 
least between border polls; Northern Ireland Act 1998, Sch.1, para.3 (UK). 
137 See Padfield v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 and R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 All ER 244. See also R. Humphreys, Countdown to Unity: 
Debating Irish Reunification (Irish Academic Press, 2009) p.122. 
138 The importance of the issues at stake make it highly likely that the courts would insist upon transparency 
over the reasons behind a border poll decision; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody 
[1994] 1 AC 531, 561 (Lord Mustill). 
139 See Lord Ashcroft, My Northern Ireland survey finds the Union on a knife-edge (11 September 2019) available 
at https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/09/my-northern-ireland-survey-finds-the-union-on-a-knife-
edge/#more-16074 (last accessed 25 October 2019). 
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weight of evidence might be such that the courts would be prepared to quash a refusal 
to hold a poll. 
 
Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Successive UK Governments have long insisted that Northern Ireland’s place in the 
UK rests on ‘the wish of a majority of the people’.140 The Northern Ireland Act outlines 
what would happen after a referendum outcome which favours a united Ireland: 
 
[I]f the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should 
cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the 
Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to 
that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.141 
 
The roots of these terms can be traced through the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985142 
and back to the 1973 Sunningdale draft declaration.143 As Morgan notes, ‘[s]hall lay 
before parliament is weaker than introduce and support in parliament from 1985, and 
even arguably support in 1973’.144  
The Northern Ireland Act might therefore cloud the UK Parliament’s role in a 
reunification process, especially when the Act also affirms Westminster’s ultimate 
authority over Northern Ireland’s current constitutional arrangements.145 These 
concerns should be addressed by interpreting its provisions in line with the underlying 
GFA commitments.146 If a united Ireland is supported in both Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, the GFA insists that ‘it will be a binding obligation on both Governments to 
introduce and support in their respective Parliaments legislation to give effect to that 
                                                          
140 HM Government, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion (1972) para.79. 
141 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.1(2) (UK). 
142 Agreement on Northern Ireland, Ireland-United Kingdom (1985) 24 ILM 1579, Art 1(a)-(c). 
143 See Morgan, n.12, para.10.17. 
144 ibid., para.10.24. 
145 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.5(6) (UK). See B. Hadfield, ‘The Belfast Agreement, Sovereignty and the State of 
the Union’ [1998] Public Law 599, 615. 
146 ‘[T]he words of a statute passed after the Treaty has been signed and dealing with the subject matter of the 
international obligation of the United Kingdom, are to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing 
such a meaning, as intended to carry out the obligation, and not to be inconsistent with it.’ Garland v British Rail 
Engineering Ltd [1983] 2 AC 751, 771 (Lord Diplock). 
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wish’.147 Whatever the Northern Ireland Act’s wording, the UK Government is, in such 
circumstances, under an international obligation to support legislation to give effect to 
this commitment. This obligation would influence how the courts interpret section 1 of 
the Northern Ireland Act in any subsequent litigation on the issue.148 Any apparent 
watering down of the UK Government’s commitment in the wording Northern Ireland 
Act is therefore less significant than the underlying GFA commitment.149 Section 1 
also, surprisingly, implies that legislation would be initiated if Northern Ireland voted in 
favour of a united Ireland, even if Ireland’s voters did not also do so. This language 
could be a manifestation of the uncertainty, noted above, over whether the GFA (as 
opposed to Ireland’s Constitution) mandates concurrent referendums. At the least, a 
Northern Ireland vote in favour of reunification which is not reciprocated in Ireland 
could be used to permit Westminster to transfer further powers to Northern Ireland.  
Given that successive UK administrations have explicitly reaffirmed their 
commitment to the principle of consent,150 this debate could well be academic. If the 
UK Government did, however, refuse to act on a referendum outcome in favour of 
reunification, it would precipitate a constitutional crisis. UK courts would not ordinarily 
challenge proceedings in Parliament,151 and it would therefore be difficult to use 
domestic legal mechanisms to oblige a reluctant UK Government to table and support 
legislation. Such a potential clash between two ‘constitutionally significant’ statutes (in 
this instance the pledges contained within the Northern Ireland Act, as interpreted in 
light of the GFA, and the sanctity of proceedings in Parliament under the Bill of Rights) 
is envisaged by Lords Neuberger and Mance in the UK Supreme Court’s HS2 
decision.152 Arguably in such circumstances a judicial ruling would have to take into 
account the decision of the people of Northern Ireland.153 The UK Supreme Court’s 
                                                          
147 GFA, n.1, Constitutional Issues, para.1(iv). 
148 See Robinson, n.130, [30] (Lord Hoffmann), although for a dissenting expression of the contrary position, see 
[61] (Lord Hutton). 
149 This commitment does not, as such, exist purely on the ‘international plane’; see Miller, n.21, [104] and 
McCord, n.5, [97]  
150 See Joint Report, n.37, para.44. 
151 Bill of Rights 1688, Art.9. 
152 R (on the application of Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3; 
[2014] 1 WLR 324, [207]. 
153 Although claims about the importance of the “will of the people” as expressed in the Brexit referendum did 
not sway the UK Supreme Court in Miller; Miller, n.21, [124]. 
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Miller and Cherry154 decision also illustrates its willingness to sidestep ‘proceedings in 
Parliament’ arguments where significant constitutional principles are at issue.155 
If a UK Government went one step further, and sought to expressly repeal the 
Northern Ireland Act’s consent provisions, to thwart the obligation to hold a referendum 
or give effect to its outcome, the UK Courts would again have to decide whether to 
give effect to the will of Parliament when it enacted the 1998 Act or the will of the 
current Parliament. The best way to conceive of these Northern Ireland Act provisions 
is as a ‘manner and form’ restriction on the activities of future Parliaments, in that 
legislators must follow the 1998 Act’s process if they seek to legislate in a way which 
affects Northern Ireland’s contingent status as part of the UK.156 Although it would fly 
in the face of more traditional accounts of parliamentary sovereignty some judges, 
notably Baroness Hale in Jackson,157 have suggested that the courts would be able to 
determine whether Parliament in 1998 successfully tied the hands of future legislators, 
as ‘Parliament is not permitted to ignore these requirements when passing legislation 
on those matters’.158 Not all her fellow judges in Jackson were enthusiastic about this 
approach to parliamentary sovereignty.159 Any attempt by the UK Parliament to neglect 
these GFA requirements would, of course, also precipitate a clash between the UK’s 
international legal obligations and parliamentary sovereignty. The centre of gravity of 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional order nonetheless remains the GFA, making any such 




Contingent and Non-Constitutional Referendums 
Article 3.1 of the Irish Constitution conditions the reunification process by separating 
the Irish nation from the state and recognising the variety of identities and traditions 
on the island. It also rules out any possible use of force to unite the island under one 
                                                          
154 R (on the application of Miller and Cherry) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41. 
155 ibid., [68]. 
156 See J. Morison and S. Livingstone, Reshaping Public Power: Northern Ireland and the British Constitutional 
Crisis (Sweet and Maxwell, 1995) p.105. 
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jurisdiction.160 Article 3 establishes that Ireland can only be reunified through 
democratic processes involving consent in both jurisdictions. In this regard Article 3 is 
more explicit than the GFA about the need for a democratic expression in both 
jurisdictions.161 Article 3 and 46 of the Constitution, however, impose no requirement 
for a constitutional referendum; a non-constitutional referendum or a contingent 
constitutional referendum are also possible.  
The process for amending the Irish Constitution, under Article 46 and the 
Referendum Acts, is relatively straightforward.162 The 1998 referendum on changing 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution was nonetheless unusual in that it required a 
set of GFA arrangements to fall into place before the new articles became part of the 
Constitution’s text.163 While there was overwhelming support for changing the 
Constitution, these changes contingent upon the UK’s enactment of the Northern 
Ireland Act (in particular, instituting power sharing) and the Human Rights Act 
(securing the UK’s human rights commitments), amongst other elements.164 Article 
29.7.3˚ to 5˚ were inserted as interim provisions to apply between the passing of the 
referendum and, as referred to in Article 29.7.3˚, an Irish Government declaration that 
all parties had complied with their obligations.165 If the GFA had not been 
operationalised within 12 months, or an extended period as prescribed by law, then 
the new Article 29.7.3˚ to 5˚ would have ceased to be constitutional text. Strictly 
speaking, the Irish referendum in 1998 amended Article 29, in doing so permitting 
Articles 2 and 3 to be amended upon the Government’s declaration that the conditions 
had been met. This process can be likened to the Irish Constitution’s original transitory 
provisions, Articles 51 and 52, which allowed for the amendment of the Constitution 
by ordinary legislation for a period of three years after the Constitution came into effect 
                                                          
160 There is considerable debate over tensions between the use of force and self-determination; see J.D. Ohlin, 
‘The Right to Exist, the Right to Resist’ in F.R. Tesón (ed), The Theory of Self-Determination (CUP, 2016) 70, p.87. 
161 Had Article 3 not been so explicit, the example of Germany suggests that reunification, if envisaged in the 
Constitution, would not require a referendum in the continuing state; Frowein, n.68, 158. 
162 Referendum Act 2001 (Ireland), Referendum Act 1998 (Ireland) and Referendum Act 1994 (Ireland). See O. 
Doyle, The Constitution of Ireland: A Textual Analysis (Hart, 2018) pp.198-203. 
163 D. O’Donnell, ‘Constitutional Background to and Aspects of the Good Friday Agreement – A Republic of Ireland 
Perspective’ (1999) 50 NILQ 76, 76. Although two other contingent referendums did not pass (Twenty-fifth 
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164 GFA, n.1, Constitutional Issues, Annex B and British-Irish Agreement, Article 4(3). 
165 ‘British-Irish Agreement: Announcement’ Dáil Debates, Vol.512, No.2, p.3, cc.337–340 (2 December 1999). 
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in 1937.166 Once the initial transition period passed, Article 52 provided that these 
transitional amendment powers fell from the official text of the Constitution.  
The constitutionality of the contingent constitutional referendum was litigated in 
Riordan, a challenge which was dismissed in both the High Court and the Supreme 
Court.167 Barrington J stated that:  
 
The people have a sovereign right to grant or withhold approval to an 
amendment to the Constitution. There is no reason therefore why they should 
not, provided the matter is properly placed before them, give their approval 
subject to a condition.168  
 
The Irish courts have repeatedly re-affirmed the paramountcy of popular sovereignty 
in the process of constitutional amendments.169 As such, it would be possible for a 
reunification referendum in Ireland to be contingent on Northern Ireland also voting for 
reunification and/or Westminster giving effect to the outcome of such a vote.  
It is also possible for Ireland to hold non-constitutional referendums (or 
plebiscites), albeit such a vote could not of itself change the content or interpretation 
of the Constitution. The Local Government Act 2019, for example, provided for three 
plebiscites on directly elected mayors. Under the terms of the Act, unlike constitutional 
referendums, the Referendum Commission had no responsibility for these 
plebiscites.170 The Irish Constitution potentially allows for a constitutional referendum, 
contingent constitutional referendum or non-constitutional referendum to take place 
concurrently with Northern Ireland’s vote on reunification. This gives a measure of 
flexibility to structuring a reunification process which takes full account of principles of 
self-determination, democracy and constituent power. 
 
                                                          
166 There had been considerable controversy about the transitionary arrangements under the 1922 Constitution, 
when the Irish Government used Article 2A to extend its emergency powers, prompting a legal challenge; The 
State (Ryan) v Lennon [1935] IR 170. See A. Greene, Permanent States of Emergency and the Rule of Law: 
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170 Local Government Act 2019, s.4 (Ireland). Article 27 of the Irish Constitution provides that the President, after 
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Mutually Assured Construction  
 
The GFA’s Continuing Provisions  
Aspects of Northern Ireland and Ireland’s governance became increasingly intertwined 
after the GFA. When voters in Ireland agreed to amendments to Articles 2 and 3 which 
Unionists ‘found offensive or threatening’,171 in a parallel referendum to the vote on 
the Agreement in Northern Ireland, these changes provided a justification for pro-
Agreement Unionists accepting North-South co-operation and integration across 
multiple areas of governance. The GFA, however, did not stop at cross-border 
cooperation. It also required that ‘whatever choice’ the people of Northern Ireland 
make in a referendum, ‘the power of the sovereign government with jurisdiction there 
shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality’.172 In other words, the GFA includes 
“future-lock” provisions which operate whatever constitutional future transpires.  
As Jim Bulpitt presciently recognised in 1983, Ireland’s reunification would have 
to be preceded by a ‘future contract which Dublin would offer the majority community 
in Norther Ireland’.173 In 1998, Ireland’s then-Attorney General went out of his way to 
highlight that ‘the commitments in the British-Irish Agreement to equality of treatment 
and parity of esteem, and to the dual citizenship rights of the people of Northern 
Ireland, are explicitly to apply irrespective of the status of Northern Ireland’.174 These 
provisions were intended to provide a ‘reassuring and confidence-building’175 baseline 
of protections which would apply upon Northern Ireland’s eventual reunification with 
Ireland. They contrast with those GFA terms which would no longer operate after 
reunification, most prominently the contingent references to UK sovereignty. Other 
GFA provisions might be retained, or reworked, dependent on the shape of the 
constitutional settlement for the united polity. For instance, Article 3.2 of the Irish 
Constitution gives authority for cross-border bodies to be created on the island under 
the GFA, acknowledging a form of joint decision-making which may impact on either 
jurisdiction. This provision would make little sense after reunification, unless some 
internal jurisdictional division of Ireland persists. 
                                                          
171 Byrne, n.9, 1216. For detailed analysis of these changes, see D. Clarke, ‘Nationalism, the Irish Constitution, 
and Multicultural Citizenship’ (2000) 51 NILQ 100. 
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The GFA makes no provision for unilateral withdrawal by either of its state 
parties,176 and there is no basis for claiming that unification would amount to a 
‘fundamental change’ vitiating the GFA’s future lock.177 Sceptics, however, might 
perceive little protection in the future lock. Despite its assurances, the DUP leader 
Arlene Foster, has claimed that she would probably emigrate in the event of Ireland’s 
reunification.178 The Sino-UK Joint Declaration on Hong Kong of 1984 is notable in 
that it also included conditions which were intended to remain in effect after the Hong 
Kong’s hand over to China in 1997.179 And yet, over two decades into the practice of 
“one country, two systems”, this mantra has worn thin.180 The GFA’s commitments, 
however, extend beyond the issues covered within the 1984 Joint Declaration, which 
focuses upon Hong Kong as an economy and trading centre. The GFA’s commitments 
explicitly cover East-West cooperation, the birthright of the people of Northern Ireland 
to claim UK or Irish citizenship and, as we have seen, ‘rigorous impartiality’ in official 
treatment of Unionists and Nationalists.181 This lock is therefore much more difficult to 
pick, and aims to ensure that the aftermath of a reunification vote will not involve a 
‘sudden, triumphalistic hoisting of a tricolour at Parliament buildings in Stormont at 12 
noon on some wet Tuesday following a border poll’.182 They can even be conceived 
as an ur-text for parts of the Constitution of a reunified Ireland.  
 
Stitching Together Two Polities  
Although, as discussed above, Ireland will almost certainly be the successor state on 
the island following a reunification vote, the GFA requires that aspects of the two 
polities be stitched together, rather than Ireland subsuming Northern Ireland. This 
raises a range of challenges to be navigated and deliberated upon within both polities, 
                                                          
176 C. Murray, A. O’Donoghue and B. Warwick, ‘The Implications of the Good Friday Agreement for UK Human-
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and the handful of existing examples of peaceful exercises of self-determination by 
unification provide some important insights. 
 Brexit will potentially make it more difficult to integrate Northern Ireland into 
Ireland; the latter will continue to be an EU member state, and the former will start to 
diverge from areas of EU law (with the degree of divergence being dependent upon 
the terms of any Withdrawal Agreement183). Indeed, an underlying element in the 
support for Brexit within elements of Unionist opinion is the idea that taking Northern 
Ireland out of the EU will shift it out of alignment with Ireland and make reunification 
more difficult to realise.184 Elements of continuity matter when a people is given the 
opportunity to fundamentally change its governance order. One prominent factor in the 
Scottish National Party’s pitch for independence ahead of the 2014 referendum, for 
example, was that Scotland would remain within the EU, providing for a degree of 
continuity which might sway some doubters towards the independence cause.185 As 
we have seen, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum the Irish Government moved 
quickly to gain the European Council’s support for recognition that Irish unification 
would see Northern Ireland automatically integrated into the EU, notwithstanding the 
difficulties posed by any post Brexit divergences.186  
Beyond the immediate Brexit backdrop, steps could be taken regarding the 
changes to the Irish Constitution which reunification could necessitate. This is a 
difficult process to initiate, in part because it requires Northern Ireland’s people to 
engage with an unfamiliar codified constitutional culture, and Ireland’s people to 
reopen a range of hitherto settled constitutional provisions.187 Article 3 of the 
Constitution would need to be altered if the will of the Irish people for unity was fulfilled. 
Article 7, on the flag, would need to be considered in the context of addressing Unionist 
population. Article 8, which makes Irish the first official language and English the 
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second, might also need to be considered, perhaps to incorporate Ulster Scots or take 
away the primacy of Irish.188 Article 9.3 on loyalty and fidelity to the state and 
references to the Holy Trinity in the Preamble, for example, might need to be 
reconsidered to accommodate the significant Protestant minorities which would 
become part of the state’s constituents. Article 15.2.2˚ contains provisions for ‘for the 
creation or recognition of subordinate legislatures and for the powers and functions of 
these legislatures’ which could accommodate the continuation of the Stormont 
Assembly in some form, albeit not with any scope for executive authority, under Article 
28.2, which makes no provision for subordinate executive competence.189 Article 18 
on the Seanad may also be revised to incorporate further constituencies for instance 
representing Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University as enumerated 
alongside the NUIs and Trinity.190 There are also questions over the extent to which 
the police and armed forces, human rights bodies and other administrative structures 
in both polities would continue, be merged or be reconstituted. Given that far reaching 
constitutional upheaval is thus all but inevitable, an entirely new constitution could also 
be contemplated to better reflect the wishes of the constituents of a unified polity. In 
short, assumptions in either polity about what groups in the other would desire or 
demand must therefore give way to active deliberation and discussion. 
The questions become when and how these decisions are to be made. Ought 
they be contingent on Northern Ireland voting for unification, be made after unification 
as part of constituting the new polity, or settled, on a contingent basis, in the run up to 
the referendums on reunification? The processes and timings of deliberation require 
careful reflection.191 In Ireland, deliberations on constitutional change take myriad 
forms. Recent examples include the 2016-2018 Citizen’s Assembly and the 2014 
Constitutional Convention.192 There are also examples for other jurisdictions providing 
assemblies for citizen-based deliberations, including British Colombia, Ontario and the 
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Netherlands.193 Historically, reviews of the Irish Constitution have been led by 
“experts”, including Informal Committee on the Constitution in 1967, and the 
Constitutional Review Group in 1996.194 Even Ireland’s ongoing Citizen’s Assembly is 
heavily reliant upon expert evidence on law and other matters.195 Other bodies, 
however, have created a space for deliberation on governance challenges affecting 
the island of Ireland including, most recently, the All Island Forum on Brexit.196 In 
keeping with this constitutional heritage, the options for a reunification referendum 
must prioritise the authority to the peoples of the island to frame their own 
constitutional future. Such deliberations could potentially range across the protection 
of human rights,197 the substantive character of parity of esteem in a new polity, the 
impact of reunification on Ireland’s relations with the UK, the legacy of the Northern 
Ireland conflict, the continuation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the character 
of public services in the new polity.  
 
Modelling the reunification referendums 
 
The Franchise for Concurrent Referendums 
 
Whatever model is chosen for the concurrent referendums on the constitutional status 
of Northern Ireland, one necessary preliminary step is to determine the franchise for 
these votes. The key GFA provision explains that: 
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[I]t is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two 
parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and 
South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right 
must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent 
of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.198  
 
The italicised text requires unpacking. One issue is the requirement that consent be 
‘freely and concurrently given, North and South’; what amounts to a free-and-fair 
referendum and to what extent do the rules on the conduct of such votes have to align 
in both polities? A further issue concerns the thorny issue of the ‘people of Northern 
Ireland’. Given that their majority consent is required in the Northern Ireland 
referendum, does this entail the creation of a special franchise open to this people? 
The Northern Ireland Act, after all, makes provision for special electoral arrangements 
for a reunification referendum to reflect these GFA terms.199 
 First to the issue of alignment between the two referendums. The GFA could 
be read as requiring that, at a minimum, the votes in Northern Ireland and Ireland be 
free-and-fair, by connecting the use of the term ‘freely’ to international human rights 
standards applicable to the right to vote.200 In 1998, the franchise for the concurrent 
referendums on the GFA broadly aligned. Both were open to citizens who were over 
the age of 18 and not imprisoned on polling day. There were some differences (which 
persist). For one, UK electoral law permitted citizens who had been overseas for less 
than 15 years to remain on the electoral register for their “home” constituency,201 
whereas Ireland’s law imposes residency requirements for referendums.202 For 
another, the Northern Ireland vote, based on the Westminster elections franchise, 
allowed a vote to some groups of non-citizens, whereas the vote in Ireland did not. 
Irish citizens from the Republic of Ireland who were living in Northern Ireland were 
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therefore able to vote in the Northern Ireland referendum, but not UK citizens living in 
the Republic of Ireland. 
Since 1998, however, the basic franchise arrangements for referendums in 
Ireland and Northern Ireland have diverged (and could diverge further). All citizen 
prisoners have been able to vote in Ireland since 2006,203 a move which the Irish 
Government expressly connected to Ireland’s duty under the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), following the case of Hirst v United Kingdom,204 to fulfil the 
right to free and fair elections.205 In the UK, by contrast, successive governments have 
loudly complained about the requirements of the Hirst judgment, and have taken only 
the most minimal steps to enfranchise day-release prisoners.206 In the course of this 
crisis the Strasbourg Court has interpreted the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol 1 
ECHR restrictively, as applying to only elections and not referendums.207 This overt 
effort to placate the UK Government, amid a growing crisis over the UK’s continued 
adherence to the ECHR, would not foreclose the issue before the UK and Ireland’s 
domestic courts if the GFA is interpreted as requiring alignment on what constitute a 
free vote in the two polities.  
Following the Scottish Parliament’s decision to enfranchise 16-to-17-year-olds 
in the 2014 independence referendum, the Northern Ireland Secretary would likely 
face some pressure to make a similar arrangement for a reunification referendum in 
Northern Ireland.208 On the face of it, given the precedent set in Scotland, the 
arguments for enfranchising this group would seem no less strong in the Northern 
Ireland context.209 One problem, however, is the degree to which such a move would 
oblige Ireland to follow suit, particularly in the context of a constitutional referendum, 
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as such changes would require a prior adjustment to Article 16.1.2° of Ireland’s 
Constitution (which stipulates a voting age of 18).210 The enfranchisement of 16-to-17 
year-olds in the Scottish Independence referendum, moreover, took considerable time 
to organise. When suggestions were made about a similar adjustment to the franchise 
in the run in to the Brexit referendum in 2016, the UK’s Electoral Commission 
estimated that making such arrangements would delay the vote for a year.211 
 Even if the GFA does not ‘de jure’ mandate concurrent polls,212 the practical 
effect of its terms is that ‘there would have to be an agreement between the UK and 
the Republic to have parallel polls in each jurisdiction’.213 Such an agreement will also, 
in light of the above analysis, have to set expectations as to what both Ireland and the 
UK would accept as constituting a free-and-fair poll and justify disparities between 
Ireland and Northern Ireland’s franchises. In Ireland, the choices of constitutional or 
non-constitutional referendum will affect flexibility over the franchise.214 Given the 
experience of the Scottish Independence and Brexit referendums, it is a virtual 
certainty that the terms of the referendum franchise will be litigated in Northern Ireland. 
The special context of these concurrent polls, moreover, means that it is likely that the 
courts will be asked to pay close attention to disparities on either side of the border. 
Should one poll be held ahead of the other, for instance, would this unduly impact 
upon the second vote, and if so, which polity should go first? There is also the question 
of purdah in Ireland before referendum and whether, if voting is on the same topic, this 
rule should be suspended or extended to Northern Ireland. If this groundwork is 
rushed, the two Governments will be relying on the courts extending them a 
considerable measure of deference given the complexity of making such concurrent 
arrangements, which is hardly a comforting scenario given the importance of the 
issues at stake. 
 The second element of the GFA text highlighted above, requiring the 
‘agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland’, is even more 
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likely to be litigated. This clause has been disputed since the 1998 settlement was 
unveiled. Various commentators have insisted that the UK’s sovereignty over Northern 
Ireland could not be brought to an end by a simple 50-percent-plus-one majority.215 
Seamus Mallon has recently joined this chorus by calling for ‘Parallel Consent’ to be 
achieved amongst both Nationalists and Unionists in Northern Ireland.216 As 
Humphreys insists, however, a simple majority is the only reading of the GFA text 
which is compatible with the underlying principle of parity of esteem between Unionists 
and Nationalists within Northern Ireland.217 There is, moreover, nothing within the 
GFA’s text which would support a deviation from the presumption in favour of a simple 
majority approach which emerges from the general principles of self-determination and 
democracy, as explored above.218 Quite apart from the force of these arguments in 
favour of a simple majority, there is no workable way to divide the entire electorate into 
Unionists and Nationalists, as Mallon suggests, in a manner that mirrors the 
designation system for Members of the Legislative Assembly.219 
The ‘people of Northern Ireland’ element of this clause could present intractable 
difficulties. This formulation was developed over decades by John Hume as a means 
of encompassing all of the holders of constituent power in Northern Ireland, whether 
they personally identified as British, Irish, Northern Irish, did not fit within those 
categories or preferred to avoid fraught questions of identity.220 The category has 
taken on further significance within the Brexit context, providing a basis for 
negotiations over parts of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol.221 An interpretive 
provision within the GFA states that the ‘people of Northern Ireland’ covers ‘all persons 
born in Northern Ireland and having, at the time of their birth, at least one parent who 
is a British citizen, an Irish citizen or is otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland 
without any restriction on their period of residence’.222 Without this stipulation the 
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concept risks being ‘amorphous’,223 but the certainty that it provides carries 
consequences for the franchise for any reunification referendum.  
The GFA’s linkage of a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional status to 
majority assent by the people of Northern Ireland does not merely suggest the 
possibility of special franchise arrangements for a reunification vote, it effectively 
obliges them as a matter of international law. Its terms have the literal effect of 
excluding from this franchise people resident in Northern Ireland but born outside it, 
regardless of connections or citizenship. Many people who voted on the GFA in 1998 
would, ironically, have no right to vote in a reunification referendum if its franchise was 
constructed on this basis. History suggests that these exclusions are not, however, 
accidental. The UK Government conducted the 1973 border poll on the basis of the 
franchise for the then-defunct Northern Ireland Parliament, not the Westminster 
franchise, thereby excluding some 2000 people born in Ireland.224 Civil servants 
justified this approach on the basis of a supposed need to prioritise those with a deep 
connection to the polity,225 but the decision reflected Unionist concerns about the votes 
of people from Ireland resident in Northern Ireland skewing demographics towards 
Nationalism.226 The UK Government has not clarified its stance on this issue. When 
Karen Bradley, then Northern Ireland Secretary, was asked about how she would 
exercise her powers to construct a special franchise for a reunification referendum, 
with specific regard Irish citizens born in the Republic of Ireland, she appeared not to 
appreciate the context of the question and her response bordered upon incoherent, 
sparking fears for the general voting rights of Irish citizens resident in the UK.227  
Any attempt to apply the GFA’s ‘people of Northern Ireland’ franchise literally 
(excluding people born in Ireland and Great Britain) would certainly be litigated on the 
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basis of the right to vote.228 The UK courts, however, have often been unreceptive to 
challenges to decisions over the franchise.229 In one prisoner voting case, Lord Hodge 
raised the possibility of the courts declaring anti-democratic legislation to be unlawful, 
but set a particularly high bar upon such a judicial intervention: 
 
[I]n the very unlikely event that a parliamentary majority abusively sought to 
entrench its power by a curtailment of the franchise or similar device, the 
common law, informed by the principles of democracy and the rule of law and 
international norms, would be able to declare such legislation unlawful.230 
 
With regard to the franchise for a reunification referendum, the UK courts would 
nonetheless be obliged to assess the arrangements put in place in light of both the 
GFA’s requirements and the right to vote under Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR.231 The 
wording of Article 3 in terms of a right to free-and-fair elections is, as noted above, 
unhelpful.232 In the UK Supreme Court, Lord Kerr supported a broader reading of the 
right in line with Article 25 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
in the context of the Scottish Independence referendum.233 If this hurdle is 
surmounted, legal challenges would turn on the proportionality of any exclusions from 
the referendum franchise, and on the level of discretion/margin of appreciation 
applicable in light of the special nature of the GFA. The closest comparable case is 
Gillot,234 in which France’s decision to construct a special referendum franchise for 
New Caledonia, based on the Nouméa Accord regarding that territory’s self-
determination claims, was challenged before the UN Human Rights Committee. The 
Committee accepted that this franchise could be based upon based upon a 20-year 
residency requirement.235 It is, however, difficult to see how a requirement of 
connection to Northern Ireland from birth could similarly be accepted as proportionate.  
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The potential for litigation, together with the destabilising impact of any boycott 
by either Nationalist or Unionist parties, therefore mean that if the Northern Ireland 
Secretary decides to trigger a referendum on reunification, the UK Government’s 
apparently broad discretion under the terms of Northern Ireland Act over the franchise 
arrangements is illusory. Notwithstanding the terms of the discretion in the domestic 
legislation, it will need to operate in line with the UK’s GFA and human rights 
commitments. In these important regards, reunification votes under the GFA are not 
simply a “reiteration” of the position established in 1973; the UK Government’s 
discretion is more circumscribed.236 The construction of a special franchise from 
scratch in Northern Ireland would likely take a considerable amount of time, likely well 
over a year, especially if the arrangements were litigated. Such a preparation period 
should, however, be seen as part and parcel of the GFA process with regard to the 
principle of consent; it creates an opportunity to prepare for the votes. The question 
remains how to proactively use such a period to engage the peoples of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland in constructing their own constitutional future. 
 
Three Possible Pathways towards Reunification Referendums 
 
Reunification referendums could potentially take place under one of three models. 
Although these models are not the only approaches to running concurrent 
referendums, we have constructed each archetype to reflect the issues raised in this 
article. Variations in the timeline and form of decision-making under each model are 
intended to reflect rival priorities in the process. All three models involve the process 
being initiated by the UK Government reaching the conclusion that there should be a 
reunification referendum, in part because recent civil society efforts have 
demonstrated the difficulty in starting a broad conversation across Northern Ireland’s 
communities in the absence of this impetus.237 The second model, and particularly the 
third model, however, seek to move away from this top-down point of initiation under 
Tierney’s maxim that ‘the credibility of the outcome [will] ultimately depend upon the 
legitimacy of the referendum process’.238 None of these models is intended to advance 
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particular substantive outcomes (this is not, however, to say that the different format 
of such processes would not have the potential to influence the relevant outcomes).  
 
Model I 
Step 1: Evidence of majority opinion in Northern Ireland favouring reunification 
Step 2: UK and Irish Government discussions to: 
• Decide on question to be asked in both polities; 
• Decide the date of the vote and franchise. 
Step 3: Concurrent Referendums:  
• In Northern Ireland, a poll held under the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; 
• In Ireland, a contingent constitutional referendum to change Article 3 of the Irish 
Constitution. 
Step 4: Both Governments introduce legislation to give effect to outcomes of yes/no 
or split votes 
 
This model addresses the most minimal reading of the requirements of the GFA, 
constitutional and general international law. The more difficult questions regarding the 
nature of the continuing state, which we have flagged in this article, are left to a post-
reunification process. While it may lead to a shorter run-in period to the concurrent 
referendums, difficult questions around the franchise for the votes will still need to be 
addressed. Despite the potential attractiveness this model’s simplicity, it provides little 
information to voters in Ireland on Northern Ireland about the polity they are 
responsible for creating. It therefore provides a poor basis for such a decision, 
especially by comparison to the options we outline below.  
 
Model II 
Step 1: Evidence of majority opinion in Northern Ireland favouring reunification 
Step 2: UK and Irish Government discussions to: 
• Decide on question to be asked in both polities; 
• Decide the date of the vote and franchise. 
Both Governments conclude a treaty, with terms contingent on outcome of polls: 
o Both Governments agree the division of sovereign debt, pensions payments 
and any ongoing subvention for Northern Ireland; 
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o Both Governments agree to abide by continuing GFA provisions.  
o Irish Government agrees to hold an All-Ireland Constitutional Convention after 
concurrent votes for reunification covering, inter alia: 
 Article 3, Article 7 (flag), Article 8 (official language) Article 9.3 (loyalty and 
fidelity to the state), and the reference to the Holy Trinity in the preamble of the 
Irish Constitution; 
 Legislation under Article 15.2.2˚ of the Irish Constitution to 
maintain/recognise a modified Stormont Assembly (contingent upon the 
outcome of the concurrent referendums); 
o Declaration on the “continuing” nature of two states. 
Step 3: Concurrent Referendums: 
• In Northern Ireland, a poll held under the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; 
• In Ireland, a constitutional referendum to change Article 3 of the Irish 
Constitution using Article 29 and give effect to the UK-Ireland Agreement 
(contingent upon the outcome of the vote in Northern Ireland), or a non-
constitutional referendum simply setting the Constitutional Convention in train.  
Step 4: Both Governments introduce legislation to give effect to the outcomes of 
yes/no or split votes 
Step 5: After unification, a modified Stormont Assembly remains operational under 
Article 15.2.2˚ (at least for the duration of the Constitutional Convention) and the 
Constitutional Convention commences 
Step 6: The people would respond to the Constitutional Convention’s outcomes 
through: 
o A single ‘package’ vote; or  
o Votes on each of the proposed constitutional changes 
 
This model addresses the GFA, domestic and international law requirements, but 
unlike the previous model would require extensive work before the concurrent 
reunification referendums were held. Much of this preliminary work ahead of the votes 
is at inter-government level, which forefronts official considerations, rather than 
constituent deliberations. As a result this could be considered a top-down model. 
Offsetting this disadvantage, however, through the final step in this process the entire 
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constituent body of a unified Ireland would deliberate and vote on its new constitution. 
This action re-constitutes popular sovereignty on an all-Ireland basis. 
 
Model III  
Step 1: Evidence of majority opinion in Northern Ireland favouring reunification 
Step 2: UK and Irish Government discussions to: 
• Decide on question to be asked in both polities; 
• Decide the date of the vote and franchise. 
Step 3: Contingent All-Ireland Constitutional Convention: 
• Elements to be considered inter alia Article 3, Article 7 (flag), Article 8 (official 
language) Article 9.3 (loyalty and fidelity to the state), the Holy Trinity in the 
preamble of the Irish Constitution – decision on provision changes to be 
incorporated into the referendums as a ‘package’; 
• Legislation under Article 15.2.2˚ of the Irish Constitution to maintain/recognise 
Stormont Assembly if this is recommended by the Constitutional Convention 
(contingent upon the outcome of the concurrent referendums). 
Step 4: Concurrent Referendums: 
• In Northern Ireland, poll held under the terms of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
based on the ‘package’ produced by the Constitutional Convention; 
• In Ireland, a constitutional referendum changing articles as per the ‘package’ 
(contingent upon the outcome of the vote in Northern Ireland). 
Step 5: Both Governments introduce legislation to give effect to outcomes of yes/no 
or mixed votes 
Step 6: Unification based on the new Constitution 
 
This model addresses the GFA, domestic and international law requirements as a 
baseline, but prioritises the concurrent referendums taking place in a context in which 
the nature, structure and content of both continuing states is fully demarcated. Under 
this model the reunification referendums are based on a fully realised scheme for the 
governance of the two continuing states of Ireland and Great Britain. This model 
forefronts the constituent actors in both polities and, as such, is a more bottom up 
approach than that which was put forward in Model II. It does, however, mean that 
Ireland’s post-unification constitution will be constructed by the will of two peoples 
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rather than a single body of constituent power holders. This, of itself, would 
acknowledge how the “future lock” rights enjoyed by the people of Northern Ireland 




The GFA is the fulcrum around which issues of domestic constitutional law, human 
rights law and international law pivot in the Northern Ireland context. Although it has 
become emblematic of a negotiated settlement to an ethno-nationalist conflict, the 
ongoing Brexit impasse has exposed the degree to which its supposedly legalised 
principle of consent remains malleable. The 1998 settlement leaves some questions 
over how Ireland and Northern Ireland determine the “constitutional question” 
unanswered, but not unanswerable. This is not a failing; as Thomas Paine argued, it 
is up to every generation anew to determine its relationship with the rules by which it 
is governed.239 The subsequent revisions of the GFA’s arrangements point towards 
how it could allow our understandings of self-determination, constituent power and 
democracy to adapt to new circumstances.  
Against the backdrop of Brexit, many fear that any discussion of a reunification 
referendum is premature; that Northern Ireland is not ready for such a debate. The 
resultant desire to slow the process is, in many instances, rooted in genuine concerns 
over how destabilising such a referendum would be for Northern Ireland at a time when 
power sharing has collapsed.240 It is therefore unsurprising that the principle of consent 
has become an increasingly contested concept, and that calls are growing for it to be 
fundamentally reworked, as exemplified by Seamus Mallon’s proposals for dual 
consent. Departing from the principle of majority consent would certainly delay any 
reunification vote(s), but such a course would undermine a vital element of the 1998 
settlement. It is, moreover, unnecessary. Under our account, the GFA does not 
support a hasty vote in the mould of the 1973 border poll. The models for a 
reunification process which we have outlined demonstrate that there are multiple paths 
to addressing the social, cultural, economic and political questions at issue in 
reunification. Each model emphasises different public goods in the reunification 
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process; expediency, certainty for constituent power holders ahead of their vote, or a 
collective process of constituting a new constitutional polity after a vote in favour of 
unity. 
Even an approach which favours expediency, however, does not provide for an 
“instant” poll. The GFA requires policy makers to make choices over the franchise in 
both polities and the type of referendum at issue. It also, through the future lock, places 
important constraints on the nature of a unified Ireland, which will allow London 
ongoing input into aspects of Ireland’s governance after reunification. These 
preliminary issues will take time to address and explain, thereby providing an extended 
period for public engagement in Ireland and Northern Ireland ahead of any 
reunification referendums. The approaches adopted in our second and third models 
seek to structure and facilitate this engagement, which we regard as being more 
important for any process towards reunification than making rapid progress towards a 
vote. As TK Whitaker once commented, ‘[t]here is … no valid alternative to the policy 
of “agreement in Ireland between Irishmen”’.241 That sentiment still stands (at least, if 
we substitute the people of the island of Ireland for Irishmen), but the seeds of such 
agreement will not be sown through political wrangling behind closed doors, followed 
by statements outside official buildings which speak only to particularised 
constituencies.242 
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